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I

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LOUIS J. MONTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.

vs.

KRA TZER'S SPECIAL TY BREAD
COMPANY, a Corporation,

12810

Defendant-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
This was an action by a landlord for unlawful detainer, and a counterclaim by his tenant for damages resulting from a temporary eviction.

DISPOSITION OF CASE IN TRIAL COURT
The court, without a jury, entered judgment for
plaintiff-appellant in the amount of $2,166.99, and for
1

defendant-respondent on its counterclaim in the amount
of $102,278.56 general damages, and $3,000.00 punitin
damages.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The judgment should be reversed and remanded
with directions to enter judgment for plaintiff-appellant
in the amount of $2, 166. 99 together with a reasonable
attorney's fee, and for restitution of the premises; and to
dismiss the counterclaim; or, in the alternative, remanded with directions to grant a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Appellant, Louis J. Monter, a retired Utah
businessman now living in California, owns a lot and
building at 1241 Major Street, Salt Lake City. Defendant-Respondent, Kratzer's Specialty Bread Company
(hereinafter called "Kratzer's") is a corporation engaged in the operation of a bakery.
On February 28, 1970, Mr. :Monter and Kratzer's
entered into a lease agreement by the terms of which Mr.
Monter's building was let to Kratzer's for use as a bakery
for five years at $475.00 per month payable the first of
each month (Exhibit 2-D). At the time the lease was entered into the corporation was managed by Elsa K. Glissmeyer, but in about April, 1970, Jerome W. Yeck took
control of the corporation and there commenced a series
of defaults in payment of rentals. Mr. Monter filed an
2

action following which, in late 1970, the rentals were
brought current and a security agreement executed by
Kratzer' s ( R. 33-34) . At the same time the parties executed an addendum to the lease (Exhibit 3-D) which
contained the following provision:
"Should tenant fail to pay any moneys due hereunder within forty-five ( 45) days after due date,
landlord may at his option re-enter upon the
leased premises and take possession of same and
remove all persons from the leased premises, or
may exercise any other remedy available to him
by law resulting from the failure of the tenant to
pay rent. In addition thereto landlord may, at his
option, exercise all rights and remedies available
to him under that certain security agreement covering the personal property and equipment upon
said premises of even date herewith."
After execution of the addendum Kratzer's paid the
monthly rentals, though late, through July, 1971. It defaulted in the August, 1971, payment, and has made no
rental payments since (except for a sum deposited in
court in connection with this proceeding and later returned to Kratzer's).
\Vhen the August 1, 1971, payment had not been
made by September 15, Mr. Monter's counsel commenced proceedings to obtain possession of the premises.
A "notice to quit or pay rent" was served on Kratzer's on
September 28, 1971 (R. llO). In early October, 1971, a
check drawn by Donna Poulsen, a friend of Mr. Yeck's,
was tendered to Mr. Monter's attorneys in payment of
the August rental. Mrs. Poulsen had expected Mr. Yeck
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to cover it but he did not (R. 181), and when presente<l
to the bank for payment it was dishonored because there
were insufficient funds in the account (R. 131).
The August payment (as well as the September and
October payments) not having been made, on October
18, 1971, a complaint was filed in which Mr. Monter
sought a writ restoring him to the premises, with the
judgment to provide that he would have leave to amend
his complaint after issuance of the writ of restitution in
order to include a prayer for damages for waste and rent
(R. 84-87). A shortened summons directing the defendant Kratzer's to answer the complaint within three days
was served upon Kratzer's on October 29, 1971 (R. 84,
117), and the answer to the complaint became due on
November 4, 1971. 1 No answer was filed, and on November 5, a default ( R. 81) and a default judgment (R.
73) were entered, the judgment directing issuance of a
writ of restitution (R. 73).
On November 8, 1971, three days after entry of the
judgment, writs of attachment ( R. 65) and restitution
(R. 43) were served upon Kratzer's. Pursuant to the
writ of restitution, the sheriff entered the premises and
took possession. On the same day, a short time prior to
execution on the writ, Kratzer's attorney called to the
attention of Mr. Monter's attorney the provisions of 7836-10 U.C.A. 1953, claiming that Mr. Monter was not
entitled to return of the premises until five days after
entry of judgment. The sheriff nevertheless proceeded
tlf the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply, the answer
became due on November 1, 1971.
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with execution of the writ of restitution and the bakery
was closed about 2 :00 o'clock p.m. After some discussions, Mr ..Monter's attorneys voluntarily released the
premises about 4 :00 o'clock p.m., and the bakery was
reopened and the employees back at work by approximately 5 :30 o'clock p.m. ( R. 150).
In the meantime, on Friday, November 5, after the
default judgment had been entered, an answer was
mailed to the plaintiff's attorneys (R. 80). A motion to
set aside the default was mailed to Mr. Monter's attorneys on November 10 and filed with the court on N ovember 12 ( R. 77). On November 19 an order was entered
setting aside the default (R. 69) and permitting Kratzer's to file a counterclaim seeking $5,000.00 for lost business and $5,000.00 punitive damages ( R. 62-64). Trial
was set for December 10, 1971, approximately three
weeks after the default was set aside.
At the trial is was established that there was not any
genuine issue of fact as to the amount of the rentals owed
by Kratzer's, the amount included in the judgment being the exact amount claimed by Mr. Monter's counsel
during his opening statement (R. 39, 41, 118).
It was established that Mr. Y eek had been the manager of Kratzer's for about 1V2 years (R. 158) and that
under his and prior management Kratzer's had sold
bakery products to Continental Baking Company for
approximately 16 years (R. 152).

Jack Hart, the bread sales manager for Continental
Baking, testified that his company had been a customer
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of Kratzer's during the five years of his employment (R.
120) . On November 8, because of the inability of some
of the employees of Continental to reach Kratzer's by
telephone, he went to the bakery building and found it
locked ( R. 124, 125), and thereupon decided to transfer
orders for the following day to another company (R.
125). After he had made this decision Mr. Y eek, Kratzer's managing officer, called and asked for a return of
the business but this was refused because Mr. Hart didn't feel that he had any assurance of getting products
from Kratzer's (R. 125). Continental had had previous
difficulty with Kratzer's. About two or three weeks
earlier there had been a problem arising out of the fact
that Continental could not get products and had quality
problems with products it did obtain ( R. 126). There
had been numerous occasions in the past where a product
furnished by Kratzer's had been stale, and Continental
had received complaints from its customers about Kratzer' s products as far back as a year (R. 127). The number of complaints would vary from week to week, but
Mr. Hart said he would not have terminated the contract "then" except for inability to place the order on
November 8 (R. 128). At the time of the trial he did not
intend to give Kratzer's further orders (R. 129), and
testified that the prior difficulties had entered into his
decision to withdraw business from Kratzer's ( R. 129).
Mr. Yeck testified that Kratzer's was able to produce the next day's product (R. 151), but that Kratzer's
had received no business from Continental since N ovember 8. The counterclaim was based entirely on loss of the
Continental account.
6

At the trial it was stipulated that Kratzer's received
an average gross income from its Continental Baking account in the amount of $2,000.00 a month, and that of
this 53% or $1,060.00 would go towards profit (R. 153154) . No evidence was introduced as to the length of
time the Continental account might have been expected
to continue, or as to the length of time it would take
Kratzer's to mitigate its damages by obtaining other
customers. At the trial the attorney for Kratzer's suggested to the court that the length of time in the future
was probably "a legal question" ( R. 154).
On this evidence the trial court found that the actions of Mr. Monter (though he was in California
throughout the proceedings and did not personally participate in the actions complained of except through
counsel) were intentional and malicious and resulted in
the loss of the Continental Baking Company account;
that Kratzer's would have received $1,060.00 per month
as profit from the Continental Baking Company account
"indefinitely into the future"; and that the present value
of $1,060.00 per month for ten years was $102,278.56 (R.
40-41). The court entered judgment in favor of Mr.
Monter for his rentals of $997.49 and damages of
$1,169.20; and it entered judgment on Kratzer's counterclaim in the amount of $102,278.56 for loss of business
and $3,000.00 punitive damages, or a total $105,278.56.
The $1,425.00 deposited in court by Kratzer's was
ordered returned to it, and the judgment provided that
payments due under the lease agreement between Mr.
7

Monter and Kratzer's for the month of December, rnn,
and subsequent months, should be paid by deduction
from Kratzer's unpaid judgment. The net result was
confiscation of ..!\fr. Monter's property.
Shortly after the trial, .Mr. .Monter's counsel learned
that, notwithstanding representations and suggestions to
the court that the Continental Baking bu~iness would
likely continue into the indefinite future, Kratzer's was
and had been in serious financial difficulties. It was discovered that on January 10, 1972, one month after the
trial, the United States Internal Revenue Service filed a
Notice of Federal Tax Lien in the amount of $18,793.52
(R. 30) for taxes due as early as March, 1971, which
subsequently resulted in the sale of Kratzer's bakery
equipment and other property on the leased premises. It
was also discovered that there were in existence against
Kratzer's at the time of trial, approximately 12 unsatisfied judgments, totaling approximately $14,000.00.
These matters were called to the attention of the court in
a motion for new trial filed on January 13, 1972 (R. 22),
but after argument, and a request on the record that the
court take judicial notice of the judgments, the court
denied the motion and permitted the judgment to stand.
This appeal resulted.
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ARGUl\IENT
I

The court erred in holding that eviction of defendant-respondent violated stay provisions of 78-36-10 Utah
Code Annotated 1953.
The trial court interpreted 78-36-10 U.C.A. 1953 as
providing for an automatic 5-day stay of execution, and
held that eviction of Kratzer's pursuant to the writ of
restitution was a willful and malicious wrong on the part
of Mr. Monter. The section provides, in part:

If upon the trial the verdict of the jury, or if the
case is tried without a jury, the finding of the
court, is in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant, judgment shall be entered for the restitution of the premises. The jury, or the court if
the proceeding is tried without a jury, shall also
assess the damages * * * and any amount found
due the plaintiff by reason of waste of the premises by the defendant during the tenancy alleged
in the complaint and proved on tJhe trial, and find
the amount of any rent due if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in the payment of
rent; and the judgment shall be rendered against
the defendant guilty of forcible entry * * * for
the rent and for the three times the amount of the
damages thus assessed. When the proceeding is
for an unlawful detainer after default in the payment of rent, and the lease or agreement under
which the rent is payable has not by its terms expired, execution upon the judgment shall not be
issued until the expiration of five days after the
entry of the judgment, within which time the defendant tenant or any sub-tenant, or any mort9

gagee of the term, or other party interested in its
continuance, may pay into court for the landlord
the amount of the judgment and costs, and thereupon the judgment shall be satisfied, and the
tenant shall ~e resto~ed t<? his estate; but if payment as herem provided is not made within five
days, the judgment may be enforced for the full
amount, and for the possession of the premises. In
all other cases, the judgment may be enforced
immediately. (Emphasis added.)
Even a cursory reading suggests that 78-36-10 deais
only with trials, and that the stay provision applies where
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of rent due, and
a trial of that issue. The legislative history of the forcible
entry and detainer statute makes it clear that if there is
no such issue, or if there is no trial, the defendant tenant
can be evicted immediately upon entry of the judgment.
The statute was enacted before statehood as Chapter IV, Laws of Utah 1884, "Summary Proceedings for
Obtaining Possession of Real Property in Certain
Cases." As originally enacted, it consisted of 18 sections,
1033 to 1051. The first nine sections defined forcible
entry and unlawful detainer; provided for notices; circumscribed the jurisdiction of the courts; limited the persons who needed to be made parties; set out the requirements for the complaint and summons; and provided for
arrest in some cases. Commencing with Section 1043, the
statute dealt with default and with trials. Section 1043
provided:

"If at the time appointed, the defendants do not
appear and defend, the court must enter his de-

10

fault and render judgment in favor of the plaintiff as prayed for in the complaint."
Section 1044 provided that the defendant might appear
and answer or demur. Section 1045 provided:
"YVhenever an issue of fact is presented by the
pleadings, it must be tried by a jury, unless such
jury be waived as in other cases. The jury shall be
formed in the same manner as other trial juries
in the court in which the action is pending."
Section 1046 set out what the plaintiff was required to
show on the trial. Section 1047 provided for amendment
of the complaint if upon the trial the evidence established
a forcible entry or detainer other than that pleaded the
one charged. Section 1048, substantially the same as the
present 78-36-10, set out the remedies and the procedures. Then, as now, the entire section was preceded by
the words if upon the trial. The last three sections related
to verification of pleadings, stays on appeal, and the applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to civil actions, appeals and new trials.
In 1898, following admission of Utah to statehood,
it became necessary to re-enact provisions of the Utah
statutes. The forcible entry and detainer statute appeared as Title 73, Chapter 64, Revised Statutes of Utah
1898. It continued in substantially the same form, except
that the provisions relating to answers and demurrers,
arrest, and entry of default were omitted. The omissions,
however, can hardly show an intention to change the
meaning of the retained sections inasmuch as the chapter
was part of the Code of Civil Procedure and generally
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subject to its provisions under §3587 R.S. U. 1898. Permissible pleadings were governed by §2958, and defaults
for failure to answer were dealt with in §3179. The
amendments indicated a legislative intent to utilize general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, not to
give defendants greater rights in event of default.
'l'o draw a distinction between default judgments
and those entered after trials of issues relating to rent due
makes eminent good sense. To apply the section's stay
provisions to trials protects those tenants who have a
genuine question as to the amount of rent they owe. They
are permitted to litigate the matter without risking immediate loss of the leasehold in event the triers of fact
determine the issue against them. Without such a provision, tenants would be tempted to pay whatever amount
was demanded by the landlord for fear that the trial
might result in an adverse verdict or finding, and that
even though they were contesting the rental claim in
good faith they would have the estate forfeited without
the opportunity to pay the amount found to be due. This
view of the statute seems to have been adopted by this
court in Commercial Block Realty Co. v. Merchants Protective Assn., 71 Utah 505, 267 Pac. 1009 ( 1928), which
discussed the remedies provided by the section and indicated that where the amount of rent is "in dispute'' the
tenant may await the judicial determination of the
amount and after judgment pay it and costs and be restored to his estate.
Inasmuch as the section refers to "trial," the meaning of that word is of some importance.
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A default judgment is not a trial.
In Farrell v. DeClue et al. 365 S.W.2d 68 (.Mo.
App. 1963), the .Missouri Court of Appeals in considering the question of what amounted to granting a "new
trial" had occasion to discuss what was meant by trial.
Ref erring to an earlier case, the court said:
"The court construed the word 'trial' to mean a
formal examination of contested issues before a
competent tribunal in which both parties are present and participate, and said that 'A mere inquiry
of damages after a judgment by default is not a
"trial," within the meaning of the statute.' They
quoted with approval Black's definition of a 'new
trial' as 'a re-examination, in the same court, of an
issue of fact, or some part or portion thereof, after
a verdict by a jury, report of a referee, or a decision by a court.' "
With respect to defaults, a similar position was
taken by the appellate court of Indiana in Greenwell v.
Cunnin,qiham, et al. 70 N.E.2d 684 ( 1948) the court
said:
"It has long been settled in this state that a final
judgment entered on a failure of a party to appear
does not involve a trial within the meaning of the
statute providing for new trials through timely
motion."
The arrangement of the 1884 statute and the emphasis on trial demonstrate a legislative intent not to
grant the "stay" privilege in default cases. Changes in
other sections of the statute do not show an intent to
change the meaning of present 78-36-10. The presumption is that the original meaning continues.

13
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I
In Tyson v. United States, 285 F.2d 19 (10 Cir.
1960), the Court of Appeals was called upon to construe
the meaning of words in an act of 1951, particularly
whether the words "by law made current" referred to
coins made current by the laws of the United States or
by a foreign government. The Court of Appeals examined the original statute of 1806 and found that the term
referred to coins made current by the laws of the United
States. It rejected the contention that a reenactment of
the statute in 1951 changed the meaning of the phrase.
The court said:
"A general rule of construction is that provisions
of an original act or section reenacted or substantially repeated in an amendment are construed as
a continuation of the original law. Such provisions are generally held to have been the law since
they were first enacted."
Re-enactment of the section in 1898 and subsequently should be construed as a continuation of the
meaning in the original statute, and the section should
not be construed as applying to judgments entered after
a default by the tenant.
Moreover, 78-36-10 provides for a stay only where
the unlawful detainer action is based solely on the nonpayment of rent. There is to be no stay if the lease has
"by its terms expired," or if the action is based upon
waste or breach of covenants relating to matters other
than rent. The section provides that "In all other cases
[than simple non-payment of rent}, the judgment may
be enforced immediately."
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In the present case the complaint was based on
waste as well as failure to pay rent; in addition, the lease
c.:ontained a provision permitting termination of the
tenant's rights and repossession for failure to pay rent. In
either such case a tenant is not entitled to a stay.

II
A stay of execution mu.Yt be obtained in the manner
provided by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Even if the portion of Section 78-36-10 which provides for a stay of execution is deemed to apply to the
facts in this case, such a stay is not automatic.
Rule 62 (a), U.R.C.P., provides:
Execution or other proceedings to enforce a
judgment may issue immediately upon the entry
of the judgment, unless the court in its discretion
and on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs.
The Rules of Civil Procedure govern the procedures in all actions, suits and proceedings "of a civil nature" (Rule 1, U .R.C.P.), and all "special statutory proceedings." except insofar as they are "by their nature
clearly inapplicable" (Rule 81, U.R.C.P.).
Admittedly the rules may not abridge, enlarge or
modify substantive rights (78-2-4 U.C.A. 1953), but
assuming that a stay of execution in an unlawful detainer action for the nonpayment of rent is interpreted to be
a substantive right, a rule of procedure may establish how
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that right is to be exercised without thereby abridging,
enlarging or modifying it.
For example, the right to an appeal from a judgment may be viewed as a substantive right. Such a right
may be lost if a party fails to exercise that right in the
form and manner prescribed by the rules of procedure.
It has been held that rules prescribing the manner and
conditions to enforce the right to an appeal do not
abridge, enlarge or modify a substantive right of a party.
See, for example, State v. Birmingham, 96 Ariz. 109,
392 P.2d 775 (1964). Likewise, a rule requiring an affirmative act by the party seeking a stay of execution,
would not abridge, modify or enlarge his right to such a
stay.
The forcible entry and detainer proceeding has been
part of the Code of Civil Procedure since its first enactment; it is a proceeding of a civil nature. But even if it be
regarded as a special statutory proceeding it cannot be
said that requiring a court order for the stay is "clearly
inapplicable." The California statute upon which Utah's
was based has been amended to do exactly that (§1174,
California Code of Civil Procedure) .
It follows that if Kratzer's had wanted to have execution of the judgment stayed, it should have applied to
the court for the stay. Having failed to do so, it is in no
position to complain.
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III

'l'he Court's findings as to damages were not supported by the evidence, were contrary to law, and were
patently excessive.
The evidence produced by Kratzer's in this case was
insufficient to establish either the fact of damage or the
amount of damages.
The evidence most favorable to support the finding
of the trial court consists of the following:
For approximately sixteen years Kratzer's had sold
bakery products to Continental Baking Company. On
November 8, 1971, by virtue
execution on the writ of
restitution, Kratzer's was closed down for a period of
approximately three hours, although the possessory writ
had been released within approximately two hours. On
that afternoon ~Ir. Hart of Continental Baking Company came to the Kratzer's bakery to attempt to talk to
someone about the next day's production, but finding the
building locked decided to order the next day's production elsewhere. Shortly thereafter Mr. Yeck, Kratzer's
general manager, contacted Continental but the company would not change its mind, and since that time Continental Baking Company has not purchased bakery
products from Kratzer's. Kratzer's did gross business
with Continental of approximately $2,000 per month,
$1,060 of which represented "profits."

of

There was no evidence that Kratzer's had a contract with Continental or anything more than the expec-
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tation of some additional business; that Continental's refusal to resume business with Kratzer's was because of
the fact that the company had been shut down for a short
period; that the relationship between Kratzer's and Continental would have continued for any particular period
of time; that loss of the Continental account resulted in
a loss of profits for the total business; that it would in the
future; or that the company would be unable to mitigate
its damages by obtaining other customers to replace Continental. There was no evidence of the type of product,
the demand for it, or the state of competition.
In connection with the damages issue, it was established through Kratzer's own witnesses that although
Kratzer's had done business with Continental for approximately sixteen years, only the last 11/2 years were
under Kratzer's current management; that for approximately one year Continental had been having difficulties
with Kratzer's, both from the standpoint of obtaining
necessary products and the quality of the products obtained; that Continental did not resume purchasing
products from Kratzer's because Mr. Hart felt he did
not have any assurance that he would be able to continue
getting the production; and that prior to initiation of the
action by Mr. Monter, Kratzer's had fallen three months
behind in the payment of rentals under its lease.
On this state of the evidence the trial court made
the following findings of fact:
"15. That during the time that the defendant's
business was closed down one of the defendant's
customers, Continental Baking Company, was un-
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able to contact defendant and place its orders for
that day, and sent a representative down to the
premises of defendant and saw that the place was
closed and no one working and decided that they
would no longer do business with defendant.
"16. That Continental Baking Company was a
customer of defendants for some seventeen ( 17)
years prior to the 8th day of November, 1971, and
would have continued its business relationship
with defendant except for the fact that it was unable to fill its orders on that day.

"17. That the average gross business done by
defendant with the Continental Baking Company
prior to the 8th day of November, 1971 was
$2,000 per month of which was 53% or $1,060
per month represented profit to defendant.
"18. That defendant would have received
$1,060 per month profit from the Continental
Baking Company account indefinitely into the
future.
"19. That the present value of $1,060 per

month for ten ( 10) years is $102,278.56."

Although the cases do not always separate the problems, it is recognized generally that proof of damages
involves two separate aspects: ( 1) proof that plaintiff
was in fact damaged, and ( 2) the amount of the damage.
The fact of damage must be proved with the same degree
of proof as other damages, and when so proved, the
amount may be proved with a lesser degree of certainty.
But both must be proved with "reasonable certainty,"
and in no event may lost profits be awarded if they are
"uncertain, contingent, conjectural, or speculative."
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They must be based upon facts from which a reasonably
accurate conclusion can be logica!W and rationally
drawn. See 22 Am.Jur.2d., Damages, §§171, 172, 177.
With respect to the fact of damage, plaintiff's evi- ,
dence was unsatisfactory. In the first place, the ques- i
tion of causation was a haunting one. Continental's man,
Mr. Hart, testified about a year's poor performance on
the part of Kratzer's. And although he said he had or- '
dered the next day's product elsewhere because of the
inability to contact Kratzer's, it was also established that
Mr. Yeck contacted him almost immediately about the
next day's product but Continental wouldn't give the
business back. With respect to future business, Mr. Hart
testified that he had no assurance that Kratzer' s would
be able to perform. This "lack of assurance" cannot be
attributed to Mr. Monter. From the evidence the only
damage reasonably attributable to the 3-hour closing
was the loss of one day's sales.
1

But even with respect to the loss of one day's sales ,
to Continental, there was no proof as to the effect of such
loss on the business as a whole. An injured party may
not isolate one aspect of his business and base damages
solely on that aspect. He must prove the total effect.
In Guttinger v. Calaveras Cement Company, 105
Cal.App.2d 382, 233 P.2d 914 ( 1951), plaintiff, a rancher sought damages for loss of income, based upon destruction of grazing land by emissions from defendant's ,
plant. The trial court instructed the jury that it could
apply either a loss of income method or a loss of rental
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value method in determining damages. The jury award-

ed damages based on the loss of rental value, and the
plaintiff appealed.

With respect to recovery of lost profits the California District Court of Appeal stated:
" ... The case, therefore, is one which would warrant recovery of damages measured by loss of
profits. But when we speak of loss of profits
caused by injury to an e§tablished business we are
speaking of the business as an operating unit. It
appears without conflict that each of the appellants operated a cattle business upon land areas
owned or rented by them greatly exceeding in
total the acreage affected by defendant's tort.
Therefore it would not necessarily follow that because through that tort they had been deprived of
the full pasturage use of a portion of the area
used in conducting their business that they would
have suffered any loss of gross income. They may
have been put to greater cost to produce the gross
income, in which event they would have been
damaged by the amount of that greater cost. Notwithstanding the diminished pasturage value of
the affected lands, their gros.'I production of cattle for market may have been equally great and
none of the appellants proved anything to the contrary. What they proved was that upon the affected areas they were able before the same was
injured to pasture for portions of the year a certain number of range cows and that these cows so
partially maintained upon the affected lands
would have produced a certain number of calves
which would have become available for the market, but they did not prove that this loss of gross
income actually occurred. To allow loss of profits
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from injury to an established business, there must
not only have been 'operating experience sufficient to permit a reasonable estimate of probable
income and expense,' but evidence must be introduced which proves the probable income and
expense and this showing must be made in respect to the business as a whole. Such a showing
the appellants did not make." 233 P.2d 914 at
918. (Emphasis added.)
The court held that there was insufficient evidence
to instruct the jury to apply the loss of profit measure of
damages.
This court has adopted the view that damages may
not be based on speculative or conjectural evidence. In
Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d. 83, 368 P .2d 597 ( 1962),
the trial court had found damages to be the difference
between the sales price of land in a breached contract and
the price at which the same land sold under a subsequent
contract. Recognizing that a subsequent sale may be evidence of market value, the court noted that in the case
before it there was a considerable difference in terms between the contract which was breached and the subsequent contract. With reference to other evidence relating to value, this court said:
"The other supporting evidence for a $180,000
dollar market value that the plaintiff claims to
exist, such as plaintiff's opinion that the value of
the [motel} would increase, and implications from
the entire record, does not contain the degree of
certainty which a reasonable ascertainment of
market value would require. This is especially
true where additional evidence was readily avail-
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able for a more accurate valuation. Damages cannot be found from mere speculative and conjectural evidence .... " 368 P.2d 597 at 602.
The rule stated applies to damages generally. It applies even more strongly to damages based on lost profits,
because profits are of necessity greatly influenced by the
normal and abnormal contingencies of commercial life.
An of ten cited case dealing in some detail with the
rule respecting lost profits and reasons for requiring evidence of a particular type is Central Coal and Coke Co.
v. Hartman, 111 Fed. 96 (8 Cir., 1901), an anti-trust
action in which plaintiff claimed defendant had inflicted
injury on his business, and the jury had awarded damages by way of lost profits. In holding the evidence with
respect to lost profits insufficient the court of appeals
stated:

"* * * Now,

the anticipated profits of a business
are generally so dependent upon numerous and
uncertain contingencies that their amount is not
susceptible of proof with any reasonable degree
of certainty; hence the general rule that the expected profits of a commercial business are too
remote, speculative, and uncertain to warrant a
judgment for their loss. * * *
"There is a notable exception to this general rule.
It is that the loss of profits from the destruction
or interruption of an established business may be
recovered where the plaintiff makes it reasonably
certain by competent proof what the amount of
his loss actually was. * * *
"One, however, who would avail himself of this
exception to the general rule, must bring his proof
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within th~ reason which warrants the exception.
He who IS prevented from embarking in a new
business can recover no profits, because there are
no provable data of past business from which the
fact that anticipated profits would have been realized can be legally deduced. * * *
"And one who seeks to recover for the loss of the
anticipated profits of an established business
without proof of the expenses and income of the
business for a reasonable length of time before as
well as during the interruption is in no better situation. In the absence of such proof, the profits
he claims remain speculative, remote, uncertain,
and incapable of recovery. * * *
"Expected profits are, in their nature, contingent
upon many changing circumstances, uncertain
and remote at best. They can be recovered only
when they are made reasonably certain by the
proof of actual facts which present data for a
rational estimate of their amount. The speculations and conjectures of witnesses who know no
facts from which a reasonably accurate estimate
can be made form no better basis for a judgment
than the conjectures of the jury without facts.
The plaintiff in this case had his bank account at
his command, which would certainly have given
him some indication of the volume of his business
before and after the interruption of which he com- '
plained. He had his ledger, in which he testified
that he had entered the charges of the coal which
he had sold on credit. The bank account and the
ledger account together, if properly kept, would
have given at least an approximate statement of
the value of the coal which he handled, because '
one would have shown his cash receipts, the other
his charges for coal sold on credit, and the pay-
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ments he received for that coal, and a careful
comparison of the two would have enabled any intelligent bookkeeper to at least approximate the
value of his business. These books were not produced. The indispensable facts to warrant a recovery of the expected profits of an established
business were not established. There was no evidence of the amount of capital in the business, of
its expenses or of its income, either before or after
its interruption. There were no data for a rational
estimate of the profits at any time during the continuance of the business; nothing from which the
jury could reasonably infer that the business was
profitable before, less profitable or profitless
after, the plaintiff's withdrawal from the club.

* * *"

In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Trinidad Bean
and Elevator Co., 84 Colo.93, 267 Pac. 1068 ( 1928),
plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to deliver the last
of a series of telegrams between plaintiff and its broker
and as a result of this failure a sale of beans was not consummated, resulting in lost profits to plaintiff in the
amount of $480.00. From a verdict and judgment for
plaintiff, defendant appealed.
After holding that there was no contract existing
between plaintiff and the potential purchaser, the Supreme Court of Colorado, reversing, stated:
"Obviously, the greater number of contingencies brought into the transaction, correspondingly
the more remote becomes defendant's liability.
'Ve are struck with the predominance of the intervening 'ifs' between plaintiff and the contract
claimed to have been lost: [naming twelve con-
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tingenciesJ. And now, and if, the substantial or
material parts of this combination of circumstances had been shown according to the facts of
a given case, plaintiff might, or might not, have
made a profit of $480.

* * *

"Whether plaintiff could have recovered if the
proof had sustained the allegations, on a case that
did not do violence to the above decisions, we do
not say, for the evidence is plain that the judgment is based on damages, which, at best, were
remote, conjectural, and speculative, and so cannot be upheld." 267 Pac. 1068 at 1069.
Although a party need not prove the amount of
damages with a mathematical certainty, he must lay before the trier of fact the best evidence available under
the circumstances, so as to enable that trier of fact to
make the most reasonable estimate as to the amount of
the loss.

In Mt. States Telephone and Telegraph Company
v. Hinchcliffe, 204 F.2d 381 (IO Cir., 1953), plaintiff
sought to recover lost profits for defendant's negligent
failure to furnish proper telephone service.

After stating the general rules applicable to proof
of lost profits, the Court of Appeals states:
"However, the plaintiff must establish his damage by the most accurate basis possible under the
circumstances. He must produce the best evidence reasonably obtainable." 204 F.2d 308 at
383.
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The case was cited with approval and followed in
Garcia v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Co., 315 F.2d 166 ( 10 Cir., 1963). See also Gould v.
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 6 Utah
2d 187, 309 P.2d 802 ( 1957), wherein evidence of lost
prospective profits was deemed insufficient to justify an
award therefor; and United States v. Griffith, Gornall
and Carman, Inc., 210F.2d11 (10Cir.,1954), in which
testimony and estimates of a company president respecting future contracts were rejected as "pure guesswork."
A case involving the length of time over which lost

profits might be recovered is Schoenberg v. Forrest, 253
S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App., 1952), brought by a sales
agent for breach of a twenty year sales agency contract
which had been in existence approximately eight months
when it was wrongfully terminated by the principal. The
sales agent put before the jury evidence of the amounts
received upon sales commissions for the eight months;
that smaller figures in two of the months were a result of
development work in New York which was new territory; and an estimate of expenses. On the basis of figures
it appeared that he received approximately $774.62 more
per month from commissions than he paid out in expenses. The appeals court held that on this evidence a
jury verdict awarding plaintiff $123,200.00 could not be
permitted to stand. In its discussion of the measure of
damages the court said:
"The most serious defect in appellee's proof
and one which is fatal to the judgment is the failure to establish facts from which it could reason-
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ably be inferred that prof its over the contractual
period of twenty year_s would be realiz.ed. * * * in
addition to showing of reasonable probability of
profit during such term. In short term contracts
such showing is generally apparent, and in numerous reported cases it appears that the term had
expired prior to the time of the trial of the case.
However, in case of long term contracts, probability of profits for periods of time in the future
may present a more difficult problem of proof,
but it must nevertheless be shown. * * *

"Although the reasonable probability of continuing profits is a matter of proof, this factor was
seemingly assumed rather than proved in this case.
This renders the verdict fatally defective as the
speculations and conjectures of either witnesses
or jurymen can not supply the deficiency of
proof. * * * We do not believe it would be objectional, and it might prove of benefit to the members of the jury to further instruct them that in
estimating the damages which have accrued since
the breach of the contract, if any, including those
which may result or accrue in the future, if any,
they shall award as damages, if any they belieYe
to exist, only such amount as is established by reasonable inference from the evidence adduced brfore them, and they should not consider nor include in their fin dings damages which are remote,
speculative or based upon conjecture and guesswork.***
"It is incumbent upon the plaintiff under the
'rule of certainty' to bring forward the most convincing evidence available to support his theory
of damages." 253 S.W.2d 331 at 335, 336. (Emphasis added.)

In that case the plaintiff's proof was much stronger
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than that presented in the instant case inasmuch as the
plaintiff did prove a contract for a twenty year term, and
put on some evidence about the character of the business
an<l the income and expenses during the period the business was in operation. In the instant case we do not have
a contract for a definite term, but only the fact that Continental Baking Company had been purchasing bakery
products under an open account. There is no evidence
with respect tu the market or the period of time during
which the business relationship might be expected to
continue. At least in Schoenberg the jury had a twenty
year term to speculate about, while in this case the court
had no such thing.
To award damages to a commercial enterprise for
lost profits ten years into the future is to assume that
there will be no changes of circumstances in that business
for a decade. Such an assumption takes no notice of the
possibilities of increased competition, of increased costs
of labor, material and other overhead expenses, of a depressed market, of the expiration and non-renewal of the
lease under the terms of which respondent remained on
the premises, of unforeseen injuries to the equipment and
premises, of replacement of equipment necessitated by
ordinary wear and tear and the expenses attendant thereto, of the continued financial success of the business
which would preclude the necessity of incurring extraordinary obligations and the cost of discharging them.
Moreover, there must be an additional assumption that
nothing will happen to the operations of the customer
whose business was allegedly lost.
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To award damages while ignoring all of the possible
contingencies that could occur in the course of ten years
time is speculative and conjectural in the extreme.
In addition to awarding excessive "actual damages·
the trial court awarded $3,000 punitive damages. Hut
there was no evidence to justify such an award. The closing of the building in which Kratzer's operated its bakery was accomplished by the sheriff's execution on a writ
regularly issued by the District Court, at the instance of
Mr. Monter's attorneys.
Punitive damages are improper under the holding in
Calhoun v. Universal Credit Company, 106 Utah 166,
146 P.2d 284 ( 1944), involving repossession of an automobile. Plaintiff had been continually late in his payments; when he was about to be inducted into the Army,
plaintiff arranged with defendant for some time to dispose of the contract. Later, defendant made several attempts to contact plaintiff concerning the disposition of '
the automobile but was unable to reach him. Finally, the
agent repossessed the automobile without process and it .
was subsequently resold. The trial court found that there
had been a waiver of strict compliance with the terms of
the contract and that the repossession was wrongful.
1

1

The trial court awarded actual damages in the
amount of $247.00 and punitive damages in the amount
of $200.00.
Holding that the trial court was correct in awarding ;
actual damages, the court struck down the award of
punitive damages:
30

"* * * the evidence comes within the rule laid
down in Hall v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.
Co., 224 Mo. Ap. 431, 28 S.W.2d, 687, 691, cited
by defendant as follows: 'The party must know
that the act is wrongful and must do it intentionally without just cause or excuse. If he acts in
good faith and in the honest belief that his act is
lawful, he is not liable for punitive damages even
though he may be mistaken as to the legality of
his act. [citing cases]'
"To the same effect is Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Ut.
295, 117 P. 54, 57, where the court quoting from
Crymble v. Mulvaney, 21 Colo. 203, 210, 40 P.
499, 501, says:
"'To justify a recovery of exemplary damages,
the act causing the injury must be done with an
evil intent and with the purpose of injuring the
plaintiff, or with such a wanton and reckless disregard of his rights as evidences a wrongful motive.'

"* * * The trial court awarded punitive damages, after making a finding that the conversion
was malicious. The evidence does not sustain such
a finding .... " 146 P.2d 284 at 288. (Emphasis
by court.)
The fact that appellant's attorney may have been
told by respondent's attorney that a writ of restitution
should not, under 78-36-10, issue until five days after the
entry of the judgment is insufficient to justify an award
of punitive damages. The fact that appellant released the
premises to respondent within two hours after the closing indicates a lack of malice on the part of Mr. Monter
and his attorneys.
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IV
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
grant plaintiff's motion for new trial.
It is well settled in Utah that while the trial court is
given wide discretion in granting a motion for new trial
its decision may be reviewed on appeal to determine if
that discretion has been abused. See, for example, Crcilin
v. Tihomas, 122Utah122, 247 P.2d 264 (1952).

!

In the instant case, an indispensable determination '
to be made by the trial court was the length of time into
the future that respondent would have continued doing
business with Continental Baking Company. There was •
no substantial evidence as to the length of time the busi- '
ness might reasonably be expected to continue, and no
evidence was introduced to show that the business would
continue for another ten years. However, the trial court
awarded damages based on lost profits for ten years from
the date of the trial.
Thereafter, appellant discovered a substantial debt
owed by respondent to the United States Internal Revenue Service, which debt existed at the time of trial, although the IRS lien was not recorded until a month after
the trial. The trial court assumed that respondent's business with Continental Baking would continue for an additional ten years but, in fact, respondent's business was
closed within a month after the trial, and has remained
closed.
It is well settled that when newly discovered evi-
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dence would produce a different result at trial or would
materially reduce the amount of the recovery the trial
court abuses its discretion in failing to grant a new trial
grounded on the newly discovered evidence.
For example, in Bates v. Winkle, 208 Okla. 199,
254 P.2d 361 ( 1953), plaintiff recovered a judgment,
based on a jury verdict, for $20,000 as damages for permanent injuries sustained in an automobile accident. At
trial, plaintiff introduced evidence to the effect that she
had suffered permanent physical incapacity resulting
from her injuries and as a result she would be unable to
follow her usual occupation of paper hanging and interior decorating. Further corroborating testimony was
introduced tending to establish her permanent disability.
Thereafter, defendants filed separate motions for new
trial grounded on newly discovered evidence to the effect
that plaintiff, during the time of her alleged injury, had
performed her usual occupation and had told individuals
that she had been uninjured in the automobile accident.
From the trial court's decision denying their motion for
new trial, defendants appealed.
After stating the requirements for a new trial
grounded on newly discovered evidence, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma stated, citing 39 Am.Jur., New
Trial, §158:
"The rule to be deduced from the cases is that
where newly discovered evidence is of such conclusive nature, or of such decisive or preponderating character that it would with reasonable certainty have changed the verdict or materially re-
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~u.ce_d the. recovery, a new trial should be granted
if it IS satisfactorily shown why the evidence Wa)
not discovered and produced at time of trial." 25.J.
P.2d 261 at 363.

And further, citing 39 Am.J ur., New Trial, §165:
"The application for a new trial should be
granted where it appears that the additional evidence, if it had been introduced at trial, would
have caused the jury to reach a different conclusion, or where its effect would have been to reduce the recovery materially. A new trial is to be
granted when the newly discovered evidence is of
a conclusive nature or of such decisive preponderating character as would, with reasonable certainty, have changed the verdict or materially reduced or increased the recovery, ... " 254 P.2d
361 at 364.
Commenting on the evidence, the court stated:

"Plaintiff sought damages for personal in·
juries which were claimed to be of a permanent
nature. The evidence was conflicting in this re·
spect. Her evidence was that she commenced tc
suffer from such injuries shortly after the acci·
dent, was unable to work and was wholly incapa·
citated to perform even household duties. Th(
newly discovered evidence offered by defendant~
was not cumulative, but was of a direct and posi
tive nature, tending to present defendants' theor)
of the case to the effect that plaintiff's disabilit)
was from a preexisting condition and was not th1
result of the accident; and that any injuries wer1
not sufficiently serious to warrant so large a ver
diet based upon permanent, physical disability
Had a new trial been granted and this evidenc
presented to the jury, it most probably woul1
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have caused the jury to reach a different conclusion or, in any event, would have materially reduced the recovery." 254 P.2d 361 at 364.
Had the evidence of the substantial debt owed by
respondent to the I.R.S. been introduced at trial there is
little doubt that that evidence would not only have shown
Kratzer's business was not profitable, but would have
affected the trial court's decision as to the length of time
respondent would have retained Continental Baking
Company as a customer. Evidence to the effect that respondent would have little likelihood of remaining in
business would certainly have reduced the amount of recovery given by the trial court. Under the circumstances,
the failure by the trial court to grant a new trial based on
this newly discovered evidence must be deemed to be an
abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
This case, if allowed to stand, will be a monumental
miscarriage of justice. The trial court may have done a
capable accounting job in "capitalizing" figures, but the
figures used ( 10 years and a return of 41/2 %) were assumed, not proved (R. 154, 167, 174). There was no evidence of anticipated return on investments or that the
business would continue for a period of at least ten years
or that during that period it would continue to realize
prof its in accordance with the stipulation entered into by
c.:ounsel. The fact of the continuance of the business and
its continued profitability cannot be assumed; it must be
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proved. There was no evidence as to the length of time
the relationship between Kratzer's and Contillental Bak.
ing Company might continue. Indeed in his comments to
the court the counsel for Kratzer's virtually conceede<l
this when he suggested that the length of time for which
damages should be awarded was probably "a legal
matter."
The trial court should not have reached the damages
issue in any event inasmuch as there was no wrong committed by Mr. Monter against Kratzer's. Under the provisions of 78-36-10 U.C.A. 1953 a plaintiff has a right tu
execute immediately on a writ of restitution issued
against a defaulting tenant. To permit a tenant to ignore
the statutory notices to quit given by a landlord, then to
ignore the summons, and finally to come in and tender
the amount of rent due, thus depriving a landlord of any
effective remedy for the recovery of his premises, would
amount to a virtual taking of the landlord's property
without due process of law, contrary to Amendments V
and XIV, U.S. Constitution. This is particularly true
where the lease contains a provision that upon def ault of
the payment of rent the leasehold interest may be ter·
minated and the landlord may retake possession of the
premises. The decision of the trial court in this case permits a defaulting tenant to thumb his nose at his landlord
again and again.
The trial court's determination to punish Mr. Mon·
ter and his counsel became apparent when on the motion
for a new trial, the court refused to consider facts which
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would have made completely irrelevant its computation
of ten years' profits. Kratzer's Bakery was not making a
profit. The loss of the Continental Baking Company account could not have led to its demise since the maximum
"cash flow" talked about in the case was $1,060.00. It
would not go very far toward retiring debts including
$18,000.00 in taxes and $14,000.00 in unsatisfied judgments.
The case should be reversed and remanded to the
District Court of Salt Lake County with directions to
enter judgment for the plaintiff, including judgment for
reasonable attorneys fee, and to dismiss the counterclaim.
At the very least, the court should be ordered to grant
Mr. Monter a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
Bryce E. Roe
William A. Stegall, Jr.
ROE, FOWLER, JERMAN & DART
340 East Fourth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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